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Transaction Type and the Eﬀect
of Taxes on the Distribution
of Foreign Direct Investment
in the United States
Deborah L. Swenson
4.1 Introduction
This paper studies how the tax responsiveness of foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) diﬀers across investment types. Most analyses of foreign in-
vestment rely on aggregate data such as ﬂow of funds, the volume of new
enterprises in the United States, or the operations of foreign subsidiaries
in the United States.1 While these data provide a comprehensive descrip-
tion of overall investment activities, they are less informative if one wishes
to analyze individual ﬁrm decisions.
There are at least two reasons that treatment of ﬁrm issues is warranted
in the analysis of the tax eﬀects on the distribution of foreign investment.
To begin, we know that any set of tax rules may lead to diﬀerent conse-
quences for ﬁrms that are in diﬀerent positions. For example, it is well
known that tax changes are likely to have diﬀerent eﬀects on old and new
capital. In the context of this paper, these diﬀerences might reveal them-
selves in diﬀerent eﬀects for new plants versus mergers and acquisitions. To
the extent that ﬁrms located in some countries are more likely to perform
acquisitions than greenﬁeld investment, apparent country diﬀerences in
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1. These are exempliﬁed by U.S. Department of the Treasury ﬂow of funds data, and by
annual Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) articles in the Survey of Current Business and
BEA surveys of foreign investment activities of foreign aﬃliates in the United States or of
U.S. aﬃliates abroad.
89tax responsiveness will reﬂect these countries’ investment compositions as
well as the structure of the tax reform itself.2
We might also expect that investors pursuing acquisitions or joint ven-
tures would place a higher value on the nontax attributes of prospective
investment choices than would foreign investors involved in greenﬁeld in-
vestment. When a foreign ﬁrm decides to make a U.S. acquisition and
selects an acquisition target, that ﬁrm has decided that it is cheaper and
faster to acquire the U.S. target’s intangible assets than to develop these
assets internally. While the ﬁrm might prefer to locate in a state that has
lower taxes, its choice will be constrained by the location and availability
of appropriate targets. As a result, taxes are less likely to change such a
ﬁrm’s decisions, unless the tax costs are extraordinarily large relative to
the nontax advantages oﬀered by a particular target. In addition, these
taxes may not impose severe costs on the foreign acquirer because the
taxes should be capitalized, reducing the ultimate acquisition price of the
target ﬁrm.
The second reason we might expect diﬀerent types of investments to
respond more or less vigorously to tax diﬀerentials is that various invest-
ment transactions will be subject to diﬀering degrees of investment persis-
tence. Investment persistence is the tendency of ﬁrms to select locations
that have already been selected by their predecessors in the industry, and
it may be driven by either agglomeration externalities or speciﬁc factor
endowments. If agglomeration economies are present, new investors bene-
ﬁt from externalities gained from operation within close proximity to other
ﬁrms in the same industry. In support of these arguments, Head, Ries, and
Swenson (1999, 1995) demonstrate that Japanese investors prefer to locate
in states that have been selected previously by U.S. or other Japanese ﬁrms
in their respective industries. This analysis ﬁnds that the tendency toward
agglomeration or investment persistence is more generally observable in
the behavior of all foreign investors.
It is also likely that investment persistence derives from the cost struc-
ture of multinational activity. In the context of exports, Roberts and Ty-
bout (1995) demonstrate how previous ﬁrm decisions can predispose ﬁrms
toward continuation of prior activity.3 Since new investors are not con-
strained by prior ﬁrm decisions, they should be more responsive to tax
diﬀerentials than are ﬁrms that have established earlier operations in the
2. In a similar vein, Auerbach and Hassett (1993) show that a country’s response to TRA
1986 depends on compositional issues, such as the fraction of acquisitions in the country’s
foreign investment. They argue that distinctions that classify investors into residential versus
territorial categories are called into question by evidence that the relative importance of
manufacturing investment increased for both territorial and residential investors after TRA
1986.
3. See Markusen (1995) for a survey of multinational ﬁrms’ decision making. Markusen
and Venables (1996) provide simulations that illustrate the potency of these eﬀects.
90 Deborah L. SwensonUnited States. As a result, I expect that states with higher taxes may, cet-
eris paribus, attract fewer new investments.
The practical implication of agglomeration economies and other rigidi-
ties in investment decisions is that past decisions will aﬀect current foreign
investors’ responsiveness to taxes. A state that oﬀers few agglomeration
beneﬁts to prospective investors may not be attractive even if it oﬀers a
lower tax rate. Although I do not focus on investment persistence in this
study, I believe it is a phenomenon for which one must control if one is
to measure tax eﬀects accurately. To implement controls for investment
persistence I introduce variables that describe the industry similarities of
states in the eyes of the prospective investor.4
This study utilizes individual ﬁrm investment transactions data. The in-
formation that is especially important to this study is the classiﬁcation of
transaction type—merger/acquisition, plant expansion, new plant, joint
venture, or equity increase—as well as information on the industry of in-
vestment. The presence of these industry classiﬁcations (in conjunction
with data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census) allows me to examine the
potency of tax eﬀects across investment types.
Other work on the tax responsiveness of inbound investment ﬂows to
the United States has yielded mixed results, though the studies that iden-
tify the dampening eﬀects of taxes on investment tend to provide more
precise tax measures.5 I ﬁnd that transaction type is another dimension
that should be considered by researchers in creating more precise mea-
sures. High state taxes are associated with inhibited levels of new plant or
plant expansion. In contrast, even after one controls for state characteris-
tics and industry-speciﬁc agglomeration economies, it appears that the
level of foreign merger and acquisition activity is positively correlated with
high state taxes. I discover that a portion of the cross-country heterogene-
ity in tax responsiveness can be attributed to national diﬀerences in the
composition of investment ﬂows, especially whether investors from a par-
ticular country have engaged more in greenﬁeld investments than mergers
and acquisitions.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 develops a simple model of
investment to motivate the importance of taxes and agglomeration mea-
4. Other studies have implemented the investment choice as a sequential decision frame-
work in which the investor chooses a region ﬁrst, then selects a state from that region in the
second stage. This framework lends itself to nested-logit estimation. I choose to condition
on investment persistence terms instead, because they allow for greater ﬂexibility in the de-
termination of relevant state choices by industry.
5. Hines (1996b), Bartik (1991), and Wasylenko (1991) provide comprehensive reviews of
the evidence. In general, more powerful tax eﬀects are found by studies that look at smaller
jurisdictions (such as metropolitan areas), as compared with interstate or international distri-
butions of investment. Greater eﬀects also tend to emerge in studies that tailor the tax terms
to the particular industry of investment or to investor characteristics, as in Papke (1991).
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Section 4.3 describes the construction of the data set and provides some
details regarding country diﬀerences in foreign investment activities.
Econometric tests of the investment model are performed in section 4.4,
which is followed by concluding comments in section 4.5.
4.2 Research Design
4.2.1 General Framework
I choose a ﬂexible estimation framework that is based on the assumption
that foreign ﬁrms have decided to invest in the United States, and that
each will select that U.S. state for which its rise in incremental proﬁts is
the greatest. This approach can be estimated by conditional logit models
developed by McFadden (1974).6 Both the ﬁrm’s activities and the indus-
trial composition of each prospective state aﬀect the ﬁrm’s decisions re-
garding current investments. Although we can’t observe proﬁts directly, we
can use information on ﬁrms’ actual investment choices to draw inferences
about the eﬀects of various state characteristics.
Suppose that, in general, the incremental after-tax proﬁt a ﬁrm earns
on a current investment placed in state s can be represented as
(1) ss s vp =∗ − 
 (,)( ) . 1
The reduced-form proﬁt function represents the additional operating
proﬁt the ﬁrm will generate if it chooses state s.7 The function includes
arguments for input costs v, and taxes 
, both of which are unique to the
recipient states. The eﬀects of state-speciﬁc factors or agglomeration econ-
omies are captured in the input costs v because these externalities reduce
input costs. Two possible agglomeration externalities would include a well-
developed supplier network or a pool of highly specialized labor. Because
the extent of these externalities rises as a state gains a high concentration
of ﬁrms in a particular industry, one would expect a state’s attractiveness
to increase as its concentration of relevant ﬁrms increases. A diﬀerence
between investment persistence based on agglomeration economies and
investment persistence driven by industry-speciﬁc factors is that speciﬁc
6. Work on investment that adopts this approach was initially performed by Carlton (1983)
and Bartik (1985). Bartik (1991) surveys work in this area.
7. I abstract from the issue of formula apportionment. Because it is diﬃcult to attribute
proﬁts precisely to particular states, states instead deﬁne taxable income as some share of
the ﬁrm’s national income, with the share imputed through formula apportionment. Typi-
cally, the share calculations are based on a weighting scheme that includes the ﬁrm’s capital,
wages, and sales in a state relative to its capital, wages, and sales nationally. See Gordon and
Wilson (1986) for a discussion of the implications of formula apportionment, or Klassen and
Shackelford (1997) for empirical evidence regarding the eﬀects of formula apportionment on
state revenues as related to state tax rates.
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may grow indeﬁnitely with industry size. In principle, it might be possible
to disentangle investment incentives based on agglomeration economies
from investment persistence driven by factor-speciﬁc endowments.8 How-
ever, this would require one to use a suﬃciently long time series, and could
be tested only if it were possible to assume that industry factor demands
were not changed over time by underlying inﬂuences such as technical
change. For the purposes of this paper, I term the propensity of ﬁrms to
cluster agglomeration, but I remain agnostic on its source. The primary
beneﬁt of controlling for agglomeration eﬀects or investment persistence
is that it provides a ﬂexible method for characterizing the states an investor
might select, rather than assuming that all states are equally substitutable
a priori, or imposing an arbitrary structure for investor substitution
among states.
Another element of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function is the price of the ﬁrm’s
output p. However, I assume that the ﬁnal goods price is the same regard-
less of the investment location selected, because there is no reason to be-
lieve that the value of a product depends on the state in which it is pro-
duced. As a result, though price inﬂuences the level of proﬁts, it will not
exert any eﬀect on the relative attractiveness of one state compared with
the others, and does not need to be included in the econometric speciﬁ-
cation.
Under this set of conditions, if the gain in operating proﬁts exceeds the
ﬁxed cost of investing in the new operations, the ﬁrm will place its invest-
ment in the state that yields the greatest proﬁts. As long as the component
of the proﬁt function that is attributable to agglomeration economies is
separable from the component of the proﬁt function attributable to other
factors, the proﬁtability of state s to investor i can be represented as
 is s us is f is s s =+ ∗ +∗ + − +    
 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) . Est-US Est-For 1 ε
In this formulation, the attractiveness of state s to the representative inves-
tor is captured by s. The Est-US and Est-For terms capture agglomeration
economies by measuring the counts, at the time of i’s investment decision,
of U.S. and foreign establishments in state s, which are in the same industry
as ﬁrm i.
The probability that state s yields the highest proﬁts to investor i is given
by the logit expression










8. One would also need to characterize how ﬁrms form their expectations, unless one can
assume that current agglomeration eco n o m i e sa r eas u ﬃcient statistic for the future path.
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mate the tax, investment persistence, and state ﬁxed eﬀects.
4.2.2 Tax Issues
The reduced-form proﬁt function in equation (1) displays the after-tax
proﬁts a foreign ﬁrm will earn in the United States before it repatriates its
funds to the parent ﬁrm for distribution to its owners or shareholders.
As a result, the amount of money that the ﬁrm has available for ultimate
distribution depends, in part, on how the parent ﬁrm’s home country treats
taxes already paid in host-country locations such as the United States.
The notable distinction to consider here is whether the parent ﬁrm is
taxed by its home taxing authority on a territorial or residential basis.
Firms such as those from France or Germany that are taxed on a territo-
rial basis are not taxed on their foreign earnings. As a result, equation (1)
provides a fairly accurate view of their net of tax earnings.
In contrast, ﬁrms headquartered in residential tax countries are liable
for taxes in their home countries for all earnings, both domestic and for-
eign. At the same time, these ﬁrms are usually given a credit for taxes al-
ready paid on their foreign earnings. The ﬁrm is left with a home tax liabil-
ity that is based on the residual diﬀerence between its assessed home tax
bill and any taxes deemed paid on its foreign income. One can not deter-
mine a priori whether a ﬁrm will pay additional tax to its home taxing au-
thority. However, ﬁrms of residential origin are likely to owe home taxes if
the rate of home taxation exceeds the amount of taxes paid in the United
States and if the foreign ﬁrm is in an excess limit position.9
The consequence of this tax distinction is that foreign ﬁrms of territorial
origin should be especially sensitive to state tax diﬀerences, since any addi-
tional taxes levied will diminish their proﬁts one for one. In contrast, ﬁrms
of residential origin may not be aﬀe c t e db yd i ﬀerences in state taxation if
the assessed tax burdens they face at home exceed the amount of taxes
they pay in the United States. However, if ﬁrms of residential origin are
in an excess credit position, then they should respond to interstate tax
diﬀerentials in a fashion that is similar to that of territorial investors, since
their proﬁts are diminished by U.S. state taxes in an equivalent manner.
As shown in Hines (1996a), the territorial/residential distinction implies
that territorial investors should respond to interstate tax diﬀerentials more
vigorously than would residential investors.
9. For the late 1980s and early 1990s this would imply that U.K. ﬁrms should be more
responsive to U.S. taxes than were Japanese ﬁrms, as the rate of corporate taxation was lower
in Britain than in Japan.
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4.3.1 Foreign Investment Transactions
The foreign investments analyzed in this paper are collected from the
publication “Foreign Direct Investment in the United States.”10 The data
deﬁne foreign investment to be any transaction for which a foreign ﬁrm
has the direct or indirect ownership of 10 percent or more of the voting
securities of an incorporated business enterprise, or an equivalent interest
in an unincorporated business. The roster of ﬁrms analyzed in this study
includes all manufacturing sector foreign investments conducted between
1984 and 1994.11
The interesting feature of these data is that they not only record the
state of the investment, the nationality of the investor, and the four-digit
Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) of the industry in which the in-
vestment is placed, but that they also distinguish the type of investment.
There are six categories: New Plant, Plant Expansion, Merger and Acqui-
sition, Joint Venture, Equity Increase, and Other. The ﬁnal category
(Other) represents investments that do not ﬁt neatly into one of the previ-
ous categories, and/or transactions the designations of which are precluded
by a lack of information. The data on transaction type are used to create
a set of interaction terms, which are used to test for variation in tax re-
sponse across transaction type.
Table 4.1 presents an overview of the data. Of the full 3,212-observation
sample, the most frequently represented transaction is Mergers and Acqui-
sitions. This is followed by New Plant and, more distantly, by Plant Expan-
sion activities, Other transactions, Joint Ventures, and Equity Increases.
The low number of equity increase observations may reﬂect reporting
diﬀerences, because it is possible that physical investments are more accu-
rately observed than are ﬁnancial decisions. Nonetheless, underreporting
of this category should not bias the estimation of coeﬃcients, because the
conditional logit framework is based on the observation of individual deci-
sions. Though the equity increase variables may be estimated with less
precision, the magnitude of their eﬀects will not be biased unless there is
some systematic diﬀerence between the universe of equity increases and
the subset that appears in the data set.
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10. The International Trade Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce is re-
sponsible for this data collection. This data collection eﬀort was initiated by Executive Order
no. 11,858, dated 7 May 1975, by which the Secretary of Commerce is responsible for “the
obtainment, consolidation, and analysis of information on foreign direct investment in the
United States.”
11. This paper considers the same data source that is the basis of the study by Ondrich
and Wasylenko (1993). However, since their work focuses only on the new plants built be-





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Although forty-six countries are responsible for the transactions in-
cluded in the data set, many of their investors conducted only a handful
of transactions each. Table 4.1 provides a view of the composition of in-
vestment types for the most frequent investors in the United States. What
is striking is the heterogeneity in investment activities. As has been re-
marked elsewhere, Japan more than other countries was engaged in new
plant, plant expansion, and joint venture activities. Although Japanese in-
vestors completed a number of large acquisitions that captured news head-
lines, they engaged in acquisition activity less frequently than the average
country. Germany was the other large investor that was more heavily in-
volved in new plant and plant expansion activity than in acquisitions. In
contrast, ﬁrms from the United Kingdom, France, and Sweden were most
frequently involved with acquisitions. If tax eﬀects diﬀer across transaction
types, then cross-country diﬀerences in investment composition could
cause researchers to attribute cross-country heterogeneity in tax responses
incorrectly to country diﬀerences, rather than to diﬀerences in transac-
tion prevalence.12
4.3.2 Investment Persistence and Agglomeration
In order to measure investment persistence, or agglomeration, I use es-
tablishment counts that are collected from the U.S. Bureau of the Census
in Darney (1992, 1996). The variable Est-USs,t provides the count of ﬁrms
in state s in the same four-digit SIC industry as the prospective investor in
year t. Unlike the investment data, which are collected on an annual basis,
the establishment census is conducted only every ﬁve years. The most re-
cent counts were performed in 1982, 1987, and 1992. As a result, the inde-
pendent variables that describe establishment activity must be attached to
recent year counts.13 For this study, transactions completed between 1984
and 1986 were attached to the 1982 industry establishment counts; trans-
actions occurring between 1987 and 1991 were attached to the 1987
counts; and the transactions of 1992 to 1994 were attached to the 1992
counts.
In Head, Ries, and Swenson (1999, 1995) it is apparent that Japanese
ﬁrms respond not only to overall establishment counts but also to counts
of Japanese establishments. To capture both the foreign element and the
overall pattern, I use the 1974–83 rosters of my transactions data to create
Est-Foris. This variable counts the number of foreign ﬁrms located in a
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12. I assume that cross-country diﬀerences are not driving ﬁrms’ decisions regarding the
type of transaction to perform.
13. It would be possible to create an interpolated series that would allow the variable “Est”
to evolve over time. However, the use of an arbitrary assignment scheme would introduce
measurement error. Another possibility would be to allow “Est” to grow in the intervening
years according to some metric, such as state income. However, this scheme is also problem-
atic, because state income or other measures that could be used to apportion the changes
may inﬂuence investment on their own.U.S. state s, in the same two-digit industry as the investor, at the time of
the foreign investor’s decision. I use two-digit counts for this variable for
two reasons. First, unlike the Census data, which includes thousands of
ﬁrms, the foreign rosters have far fewer observations. If I apportion these
observations across the ﬁfty states and into 461 four-digit SIC categories,
the data are very thin, and almost every count observation is zero. More
importantly, there is reason to believe that foreign ﬁrms may be attracted
to states based on the foreign concentration of similar two-digit industry
ﬁrms. These foreign ﬁrms may be choosing the states because they have
upstream or downstream linkages to these prior investors; or, if the prior
investors provide information, as suggested by Casella and Rauch (1997),
then informational clarity may cause the ﬁrms to choose the attractive
states for which there is an established track record.
An interesting aspect of these investment variables is their distribution.
As table 4.2 shows, the investment counts are highly skewed: whereas some
states have a large number of establishments, states in the 25th percentile
of any particular industry have no establishments whatsoever, domestic
or foreign.
4.3.3 Fiscal Variables
I measure state taxes by corporate tax rates. These corporate tax rates
were collected from publications of the National Association of State De-
velopment Agencies (1986, 1991) and supplemented by tax charts from the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. Across the sample
period, state tax rates on corporate income ranged from 0 to 12 percent.
In all years of the data analysis, the average state tax rate was between 6
and 7 percent. This provides the false impression that state taxes changed
very little. However, while the average state tax rate changed little, the
average conceals the fact many changed their tax rates in both the positive
and the negative direction.
4.4 Estimation Results
The primary goal of my analysis is to determine the tax responsiveness
of diﬀerent types of investment in light of investor-speciﬁc factors that





25th percentile 0 0
75th Percentile 20 3
98 Deborah L. Swensonmay predispose investors to choose particular states. I begin with an esti-
mation that considers the importance of investor type, then broaden the
analysis to consider cross-country diﬀerences in tax responsiveness and
how these diﬀerences relate to transaction type.
The ﬁrst column of table 4.3 provides a baseline regression that con-
strains tax eﬀects to be uniform for all transaction types. The coeﬃcient
implies that higher taxes reduce the probability that a particular state will
be picked by foreign investors. Because I am analyzing transactions data,
this describes the eﬀect of taxes on the frequency of investment, as op-
posed to investment volumes. The regression also includes state ﬁxed ef-
fects and two measures of previous industry activity. Although I do not
report the individual state ﬁxed eﬀects, they are highly signiﬁcant, which
implies that certain states have characteristics that cause them to be rela-
tively more attractive to all investors.
I also ﬁnd that both measures of industry activity, my investment persis-
tence variables, are positive and highly signiﬁcant. These coeﬃcients imply
that investors are attracted to states with a high concentration of other
ﬁrms in their same four-digit industries, and that their propensities to in-
vest in these states is further enhanced if there is a concentration of simi-
lar-industry investors of foreign origin. I interpret this as evidence that
agglomeration spillovers, or industry-speciﬁc factors, are strong deter-
minants of a ﬁrm’s location decision. The fact that the concentration of
foreign investors provides further information implies that information
channels opened by the actions of other foreign investors enhance the at-
tractiveness of a state above and beyond the attractiveness indicated by
the mostly domestic distribution of ﬁrms.
In the second column of table 4.3 I continue to work with the full
sample, but I now allow the tax coeﬃcients to diﬀer for exemption or ter-
ritorial investors, as opposed to residential or worldwide investors.14 These
results are presented in the second column of table 4.3. Contrary to the
predictions, the results indicate that the probability of a state’s selection
by territorial investors is not statistically related to interstate tax diﬀer-
ences.In contrast,Iﬁnd thathigher taxesreducethe probabilitythata state
will be selected by investors of residential origin. An F-test reveals that the
diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients for territorial versus residential investors is
statistically signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding contradicts the prediction that territo-
rial investors would be more likely than residential investors to avoid high-
tax states. However, this ﬁnding may be aﬀected by the choice of depen-
dent variable. I am observing investment location decisions, rather than
the volume of investments. Although the territorial investors may not
14. In this analysis the designation “territorial” encompasses the investments of ﬁrms from
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and Switzerland, whereas the designation “residential”
applies to the investments of Japan and the United Kingdom.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.avoid high-tax states altogether, they may place smaller investments in
those locations.15
I consider the possibility that the distinction between worldwide and
territorial investors became more powerful after the implementation of
Public Law 99-514, the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 1986). Because
the full sample covers 1984–94, the early observations predate the imple-
mentation of TRA 1986. To see whether the choice of sample period in-
ﬂuences my results, I restricted the analysis to investments that occurred
after the reform, and repeated the previous regression analysis. However,
I do not report these results because the change in time frame does not
alter the basic ﬁnding.
The last six columns of table 4.3 investigate how the tax responses of
residential and territorial investors diﬀer across investment categories. I
repeat the previous regression speciﬁcation, but now restrict the analysis
to subsamples of the data that are deﬁned by transaction type. I ﬁnd that
one cannot reject the hypothesis that residential and territorial investors
exhibit similar tax responses for new plant, plant expansion, merger, joint
venture, and equity increase decisions. All foreign investors performing
new plant, plant expansion, or equity increase decisions, regardless of
home tax system, appear to be dissuaded from selecting states with higher
taxes. In contrast, foreign ﬁrms of all origins appear more likely to select
higher tax states when they are engaged in mergers and acquisitions or in
joint venture activity.
All else being equal, we might expect that tax considerations would in-
hibit the acquisition of targets located in high-tax states. However, Scholes
and Wolfson (1992) demonstrate that there may be a tax clientele eﬀect for
foreign investors from worldwide tax countries. If the foreign ﬁrms are less
adversely aﬀected by high taxes, they may then place a higher value on
these targets located in high-tax states.16 Collins, Kemsley, and Shackelford
(1993) provide evidence that contradicts this notion. They investigated the
postacquisition performance of a number of ﬁrms purchased by Japanese
and U.K. investors after 1986. They ﬁnd that, at most, only 59 percent of
the acquisitions satisﬁed the conditions that are necessary for the Scholes
and Wolfson hypothesis to hold. More important, they ﬁnd that the most
optimistic prediction of tax beneﬁts accruing to these residential purchas-
ers is minuscule when compared with the acquisition prices they paid to
purchase their U.S. targets. Barring highly optimistic and unrealistic ex-
pectations on the part of these acquirers, the results suggest that nontax
15. Hines (1996a) provides evidence on the volume-versus-frequency question. His work
ﬁnds that taxes exert a larger eﬀect on shares of plant, property, and equipment value at-
tracted to states than they do on the distribution of foreign aﬃliates as measured by aﬃli-
ate counts.
16. If the marginal buyers are U.S. ﬁrms, and foreign ﬁrms have better tax treatment, then
they would be predisposed to the selection of these targets.
Transaction Type and Eﬀect of Taxes on FDI in the U.S. 101factors dominated tax considerations in these foreign acquisitions. One
last surprise in table 4.3 is that the positive association between taxes and
acquisitions exists for both territorial and residential investors.
The only disjoint ﬁnding in table 4.3 appears in the category “Other.”
Territorial investors appear to be attracted to higher tax states, whereas
residential investors are repelled by higher taxes. The diﬀerence in these
coeﬃcients is statistically signiﬁcant. Nonetheless, because the category
“Other” contains transactions that were diﬃcult to categorize, I do not
place much weight on this ﬁnding. The important result of table 4.3 is that
foreign residential and territorial investors seem to respond to interstate
tax diﬀerences in a similar fashion, once one controls for investment type.
In table 4.4 I return to estimates that involve the full sample, but that
allow for variation in the tax responsiveness across investment types. In
column (2) of table 4.4, I include interaction terms that allow the tax re-
sponsiveness of investors to vary across the six types of investment. As I
found with the subsamples in table 4.3, foreign investors’ new plant, plant
expansion, and joint venture activities appear to be repelled by states with
higher taxes. At the same time, the probability that a foreign investor will
perform an acquisition in a state is positively correlated with tax rates. I
also ﬁnd a positive correlation for the Equity Increase and Other catego-
ries, but neither of these eﬀects is statistically signiﬁcant. Because the
Other category is imprecisely deﬁned, I exclude all transactions labelled
“other” from my next regression, which is displayed in column (3) of table
4.4. However, the tax coeﬃcients change only modestly, leaving the essen-
tial result unchanged.
Finally, in column (4) of table 4.4, I include both the investor-type inter-
action terms and the transaction-type interaction terms for the four types
of transactions that were precisely estimated. I ﬁnd that the results for the
four transaction types are qualitatively similar to the earlier regressions.
T h eo n l yd i ﬀerence is that the statistical signiﬁcance of the acquisition
variable is diminished markedly. At the same time, the residential and ter-
ritorial variables do not enter the speciﬁcation in a signiﬁcant fashion.
These results seem to imply that distinguishing investments by transaction
type provides more predictive insight when considering tax eﬀects than
does the distinction of residential versus exemption investor type.
As a result, I move away from the residential versus territorial distinc-
tion, and perform estimations in table 4.5 that allows the tax respon-
siveness of investment to diﬀer freely across countries. In columns (1) and
(2), I consider the full sample ﬁrst, then a subsample of frequent investors.
Column (2) indicates, for example, that only three countries demonstrated
a tax responsiveness that was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Japanese
and Belgian investors appear to have avoided high-tax states, whereas the
probability of investment for U.K. investors was positively correlated with
tax rates. As before, the regressions include ﬁxed eﬀects, and investment
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tence. These variables continue to display high signiﬁcance, with the in-
vestment persistence variables implying that the interstate distribution of
foreign investment is highly correlated with the domestic and foreign distri-
bution of economic activity in the same industry.
In the speciﬁcations for columns (3) and (4), I augment the speciﬁcation
from columns (1) and (2) with tax interaction terms based on investment
type. Again, I choose to include only those terms that were signiﬁcant be-
fore: new plant, plant expansion, and merger and acquisition. Column (4)
is the analogue of column (2). I ﬁnd that the positive correlation I found
earlier for the United Kingdom disappears when the investment-type in-
teraction terms are added. At the same time, the magnitude and signiﬁ-
Table 4.4 Conditional Logit Regressions of Foreign Investment by State, 1984–1994







NP*ln(1ts) 6.5130 6.2555 8.0356
(1.1716) (1.1751) (2.0110)
PE*ln(1ts) 6.9670 6.7249 8.5039
(1.4732) (1.4777) (2.2016)
MA*ln(1ts) 3.9668 4.3677 2.2443
(1.0611) (1.0655) (1.9392)







ln(Est-USis) .7733 .7689 .7849 .7692
(.0251) (.0251) (.0263) (.0251)
ln(Est-Foris) .3074 .2991 .2537 .2988
(.0281) (.0280) (.0295) (.0280)
N 127,800 127,800 114,500 127,800
Number of choosers 2,556 2,556 2,290 2,556
Log likelihood 8085.1 8049.3 7264.13 8049.1
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. For each investment in the sample, the dependent variable codes
the recipient state as 1, and all other states as 0. State taxes are measured by (1ts), or 1 minus the
state rate of taxation. Res and Terr are dummy variables that represent residential and territorial inves-
tors. The tax variable is interacted with the following transaction types: NP  New Plant, PE  Plant
Expansion, MA  Merger and Acquisition, JV  Joint Venture, EI  Equity Increase, and OT 
Other. Est-USis is the count of similar-industry establishments in the state, and Est-Foris is the count of
similar-industry foreign investments in the state. Speciﬁcation includes unreported state ﬁxed eﬀects.
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UK*ln(1ts) 1.3933 3.3725 .6118 .0891
(2.3417) (1.5622) (2.3766) (2.0015)
JA*ln(1ts) 6.2367 4.3053 3.8987 3.2737
(1.9088) (.7570) (1.9466) (1.2308)
FR*ln(1ts) 1.5500 3.5118 .9453 1.6497
(3.0943) (2.5565) (3.1165) (2.7691)
GE*ln(1ts) 2.1288 .1918 .7150 .1135
(2.4951) (1.7789) (2.5244) (2.0968)
CA*ln(1ts) .7577 1.2021 1.4465 .7658
(2.6571) (2.004) (2.6797) (2.3059)
NL*ln(1ts) 4.4488 2.5011 4.7711 4.1261
(3.6972) (3.2613) (3.7240) (3.4691)
AS*ln(1ts) 3.294 5.2674 1.2406 1.9542
(5.2953) (5.0040) (5.3386) (5.1817)
BE*ln(1ts) 24.2665 22.4178 23.8237 23.3171
(6.3180) (6.1461) (6.4116) (6.2794)
SW*ln(1ts) 2.3058 .3712 3.5667 2.8777









ln(Est-USis) .7826 .7770 .7788 .7738
(.0226) (.0238) (.0226) (.0238)
ln(Est-Foris) .3135 .3051 .3102 .3013
(.0251) (.0265) (.0251) (.0264)
N 160,600 144,550 160,600 144,550
Number of choosers 3,232 2,891 3,232 2,891
Log likelihood 10075.9 9111.9 10045.4 9085.9
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. For each investment in the sample, the dependent variable codes
the recipient state as 1, and all other states as 0. State taxes are measured by (1ts), or 1 minus the
state rate of taxation. Res and Terr are dummy variables that represent residential and territorial inves-
tors. The tax variable is interacted with country- and transaction-type dummies. The dummy variables
for nations are UK  United Kingdom, JA  Japan, FR  France, GE  Germany, CA  Canada,
NL  Netherlands, AS  Australia, BE  Belgium, SW  Sweden. The dummy variables for transac-
tion type are: NP  New Plant, PE  Plant Expansion, and MA  Merger and Acquisition. Speciﬁca-
tion includes unreported state ﬁxed eﬀects.cance of the Japanese interaction term fall. Again, these results suggest
that many of the perceived diﬀerences in the cross-country responsiveness
to taxes reﬂect the composition of these countries’ investments, rather than
cross-country heterogeneity in the avoidance of high-tax states.
At the same time, the continued strength of the Japan eﬀect is notewor-
thy. Japan taxes its investors on a residential basis, and is thought to have
a higher rate of taxation than that of the United States. As a result, be-
cause we would predict that the level of U.S. taxes would aﬀect merely the
residual payments Japanese ﬁrms make to the Japanese government (but
not the overall taxes paid by Japanese ﬁrms), we would not expect Japa-
nese ﬁrms to be so strongly deterred by taxes.
4.4.1 Interpretation of Results
To provide an economic interpretation of my results I present elasticities
in table 4.6 that are based on prior regressions. If I consider diﬀerential
transaction eﬀects, as measured by column (4) of table 4.4, the estimates
i m p l yt h a ta1p e r c e n tincrease in a state’s taxes would cause 0.11 percent
fewer new plants to locate within their borders. The state would also at-
tract 0.069 percent fewer plant expansions. On the mergers and acquisi-
tions side, the increase in taxes would be associated with a 0.065 percent
increase.
While these responses are precisely estimated, they are all relatively
small, which may imply that ﬁrms are not likely to be dissuaded strongly
from locating in states with higher taxes, because they may have a number
of nontax reasons for selecting the states they prefer. At the same time,
these ﬁrms may decide to minimize the capital and payroll expenses they
place in the high-tax states, as these will boost the shares of their incomes
that are taxable in the high-tax states.
To put the tax elasticities in perspective, I also calculated elasticities for
the agglomeration or investment persistence variables. I learned that a 1
percent increase in the U.S. establishment variable is associated with a rise










Note: Overall tax elasticity is based on ﬁrst column coeﬃcient in table 4.3. Disaggregated
tax elasticities are based on the fourth column estimates of table 4.4.
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same time,a1p e r c e n tr i s ei nt h ef o r e i g ni n v e stment persistence variable
is correlated with a 0.25 percent rise in a state’s probability of selection.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence on the eﬀect of taxes on foreign investment
in the United States between 1984 and 1994. The results suggest that anal-
yses of aggregate data obscure some distinctive eﬀects of taxes on foreign
investment. In particular, I demonstrate that states with higher taxes at-
tract fewer new plants or plant expansions; however, foreign acquisitions
are not similarly deterred. If one instead analyzes the data delineating in-
vestments by investor type (exemption versus foreign tax credit), the re-
sults are inﬂuenced by the composition of these investors’ transaction ac-
tivities.
Work in international economics, such as Wheeler and Mody (1992) or
Brainard (1997), has used fairly simple descriptions of taxes, and has
found that the distribution of outbound U.S. investment is, at best, weakly
correlated with cross-country tax diﬀerences. This analysis suggests that
the failure to ﬁnd signiﬁcant tax eﬀects may instead reﬂect problems intro-
duced by aggregation. On a country basis, I ﬁnd very few signiﬁcant tax
eﬀects. In contrast, the eﬀects that are attributed to transaction type ap-
pear to be fairly uniform across investors. As a result, although tax eﬀects
may be present and distinct across transaction type, the importance of
these tax eﬀects may be lost when one analyzes data aggregated at the
country level.
In sum, much of what is interpreted as cross-country heterogeneity in
tax response is actually determined by the cross-country heterogeneity in
the composition of investment.
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Comment William C. Randolph
There has been substantial interest among economists in behavior under-
lying the growth of inbound U.S. FDI since the early 1980s. Given the
major changes in U.S. federal tax laws during the early and middle 1980s,
especially the Tax Reform Act of 1986, a number of researchers have asked
how those tax changes inﬂuenced inbound investment.
Most of the researchers have used aggregate time series data. Such stud-
ies suggest that the tax changes played a signiﬁcant role in determining
the levels of inbound FDI. For example, studies by Scholes and Wolfson
(1992) and Swenson (1994) focused on the importance of tax clientele
eﬀects whereby multinational based in countries that exempt active foreign
source income from tax (territorial systems) should value U.S. investments
diﬀerently than multinationals based in countries that tax all foreign
source income but allow a foreign tax credit (worldwide systems).
Of course, such time series studies have well-known potential limita-
tions. It is often very diﬃcult to identify tax eﬀects separately from the
eﬀects of other intertemporal changes—for example, in relative factor in-
put prices, exchange rates, expected rates of return, and so forth. There is
always a nagging possibility that the estimated time series eﬀect of tax
changes is a spurious indicator of time trends in other important omitted
variables.
William C. Randolph is an economist and director of international taxation in the Oﬃce
of Tax Analysis of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
The views expressed in this comment are those of the author and do not necessarily repre-
sent the views of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
108 Deborah L. SwensonAnother related line of empirical research has focused on cross-sectional
interstate variation of inbound FDI and its relation to interstate variation
of tax rates. A notable recent example is the study by Hines (1996). In this
line of research, the main econometric challenge is to identify the eﬀects
of interstate variation of taxes separately from the eﬀects of interstate vari-
ation of public services, factor prices, transportation costs, and the like.
Hines (1996) identiﬁes the tax eﬀects separately from those other factors
by recognizing that interstate variation in tax rates should inﬂuence the
location of U.S. inbound FDI by multinationals based in countries with
territorial systems by more than the location of investment by multination-
als based in countries with worldwide tax systems.
Auerbach and Hassett (1993) have demonstrated cause for concern
about studies of inbound FDI because the empirical studies group modes
of investment together, without regard to whether the “investment” takes
the form of, for example, the acquisition of an existing business or the
establishment of a new enterprise. They show that, theoretically, taxes can
have diﬀerent eﬀects on investment, depending on the mode of investment.
If so, results of aggregate studies that group the investment modes together
would be meaningful only under special conditions.
In this new paper, Deborah Swenson studies the determinants of in-
bound foreign direct investment by examining microdata on inbound
transactions. The data and her model have important features that allow
her to pull together diﬀerent possible information sources to identify the
eﬀect of taxes, and to distinguish among the eﬀects of taxes on diﬀerent
modes of investment. The data provide a richness of information on varia-
tion in the choice of investment mode and tax rates over time (1984–94),
on variation across the states, and on variation in the tax treatment of
foreign source income by the countries where the foreign multinationals
are based.
This is an area of empirical research in which there has been consider-
able interest. It has attracted some ﬁrst-rate analysis by ﬁrst-rate research-
ers, all of whom have made use of relatively scant data. It is therefore
admirable that Swenson has been able to provide new insight based on
data that have gone previously untapped for this purpose.
Swenson uses a logit model to characterize the choice, by a foreign-
based multinational corporation, of a U.S. state in which to locate an in-
vestment transaction (the basic unit of observation in her data). Because
the data span eleven years, they can be thought of as a time series of
repeated cross sections. Because state tax rates varied over the time period,
by diﬀerent amounts in diﬀerent states, she is able to study the eﬀect of
taxes while implicitly controlling for all ﬁxed state diﬀerences that would
potentially aﬀect inbound investment in the same fashion in all years. She
also includes measures to capture the possible eﬀects of agglomeration
economies on the location of investment.
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modes, the author ﬁrst estimates the parameters of a pooled regression.
She then estimates separate regressions for investments in new plants,
plant expansion, mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, equity increases,
and other modes. From the pooled regression, she ﬁnds that higher taxes
appear to discourage inbound investment transactions by multinationals
based in countries with worldwide tax systems. However, taxes do not ap-
pear to inﬂuence the investment decisions by multinationals based in
countries with territorial tax systems. This pair of results, as discussed by
the author, is contrary to the economic prediction that local taxes should
actually have a larger eﬀect on investment location decisions by multina-
tionals based in territorial countries.
A partial resolution of this unexpected result is apparently provided by
the results of separate regressions for diﬀerent modes of investment. For
the separate regressions, tax eﬀects have the predicted signs, overall, for
investments in new plants, plant expansion, and equity increases, although
only the plant expansion regression estimates are consistent with the pre-
diction that taxes should have a larger eﬀect for multinationals based in
territorial countries. State taxes do not appear to have any eﬀect on the
likelihood that a multinational enters into a joint venture. For mergers
and acquisitions, however, increased state tax rates appear to increase the
likelihood that an investment transaction occurs, regardless of the type of
home-country tax system. Based on these results for separate investment
types, it is reasonable to conclude that the estimation results for the regres-
sion are not meaningful when investment types are pooled.
Although this aggregation result is well motivated because, in theory,
taxes should aﬀect the cost of capital diﬀerently for diﬀerent modes of
investment and diﬀerentially situated investors, as shown, for example, by
Auerbach and Hassett (1993), the results for the individual regressions are
still too peculiar to provide convincing evidence that the diﬀerences in the
estimated tax eﬀects are really driven by diﬀerences in changes in the cost
of capital. The central theoretical prediction—that is, that taxes should
have a larger eﬀect on investment location decisions by multinationals
based in territorial countries—is consistent with the separate regression
results for plant expansions only. For investments in the form of new plants
and equity increases, taxes actually have the larger eﬀect on multinationals
from countries with worldwide systems. For investments in the form of
mergers and acquisitions, the tax eﬀect even has the wrong sign. It is pos-
sible that the sign reversal results from the type of clientele eﬀect examined
by Scholes and Wolfson (1992) and Swenson (1994), but that eﬀect would
cause taxes to be positively correlated with acquisitions only when the
foreign multinational is based in a country with a worldwide system. In
these estimation results, however, not only is the sign the same for both
110 Deborah L. Swensongroups of multinationals, but it is larger for multinationals based in territo-
rial countries.
These unexpected estimation results may be explained by a data limita-
tion. As discussed by the author, the data on investment transactions are
only qualitative. They don’t measure the sizes of investments. It might be
true that the number of inbound acquisitions is negatively correlated with
the total value of acquisitions in a state, although it is hard to imagine why
this would be true.
A more likely source of the unexpected results is the lack of control in
the regressions for time series aspects of the data. I’m not familiar with
the time pattern of inbound investment transaction counts, but inbound
FDI in the United States was highly time trended and apparently highly
nonstationary during parts of the time period covered by the data exam-
ined by Swenson. Moreover, such time patterns diﬀered by type of invest-
ment transaction and by location of the home countries of foreign-based
multinationals. It is likely that the same patterns were also reﬂected in
transaction counts.
In Swenson’s regressions, the tax eﬀects are identiﬁed mainly by the fact
that state tax rates change over time in diﬀe r e n tw a y si nd i ﬀerent states. In
fact, the tax rate is the only right-hand side variable that changes indepen-
dently over time. The tax rate coeﬃcients could thus be biased by the
omission from the regressions of any time varying factor, such as economic
growth, that inﬂuenced inbound FDI location decisions. Further, there is
no reason to expect this omitted time series bias to be the same for all
investment modes, which might explain why only some of the estimation
results are anomalous.
Because this study is focused mainly on the eﬀe c to ft a x e s ,a sas o l u t i o n
it may be suﬃcient to simply control for possible omitted time series by in-
cluding time trends, measures of growth at the state level, or time dummy
variables. Although time dummy variables could not be included for each
state,they couldbe includedat eitherthe nationallevel orat aregional level
to control for regional diﬀerences in time patterns of investment activity.
Swenson’s analysis in this paper is a useful contribution to our under-
standing of investment location decisions. It represents a ﬁrst step taken
with new data and provides important potential for future research. Be-
cause the data provide alternative sources of identiﬁcation for tax eﬀects,
they can be used to examine the validity and importance of identifying
assumptions made in previous research on inbound FDI. Further, if taxes
have diﬀerent eﬀects on diﬀerent types of investment transactions, it is also
reasonable to expect that taxes should inﬂuence the choice of transaction
type, a choice that Swenson’s paper treats as being exogenous.
I’ve enjoyed reading and thinking about this paper. I’ve learned a lot
and look forward to future installments.
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